Jail - Section 2
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2.  Traditional UNIX Security, or, ``God, root, what difference?" [UF].

      The traditional UNIX access model assigns numeric uids to each user of the system. In turn, each process ``owned'' by a user will be tagged with that user's uid in an unforgeable manner. The uids serve two purposes: first, they determine how discretionary access control mechanisms will be applied, and second, they are used to determine whether special privileges are accorded.

      In the case of discretionary access controls, the primary object protected is a file. The uid (and related gids indicating group membership) are mapped to a set of rights for each object, courtesy the UNIX file mode, in effect acting as a limited form of access control list. Jail is, in general, not concerned with modifying the semantics of discretionary access control mechanisms, although there are important implications from a management perspective.

      For the purposes of determining whether special privileges are accorded to a process, the check is simple: ``is the numeric uid equal to 0 ?''. If so, the process is acting with ``super-user privileges'', and all access checks are granted, in effect allowing the process the ability to do whatever it wants to [note 1] .

      For the purposes of human convenience, uid 0 is canonically allocated to the ``root'' user [ROOT]. For the purposes of jail, this behaviour is extremely relevant: many of these privileged operations can be used to manage system hardware and configuration, file system name-space, and special network operations.

      Many limitations to this model are immediately clear: the root user is a single, concentrated source of privilege that is exposed to many pieces of software, and as such an immediate target for attacks. In the event of a compromise of the root capability set, the attacker has complete control over the system. Even without an attacker, the risks of a single administrative account are serious: delegating a narrow scope of capability to an inexperienced administrator is difficult, as the granularity of delegation is that of all system management abilities. These features make the omnipotent root account a sharp, efficient and extremely dangerous tool.

      The BSD family of operating systems have implemented the ``securelevel'' mechanism which allows the administrator to block certain configuration and management functions from being performed by root, until the system is restarted and brought up into single-user mode. While this does provide some amount of protection in the case of a root compromise of the machine, it does nothing to address the need for delegation of certain root abilities.



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